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ABSTRACT. A critical set in a latin square is a partial,..latin
square which has a unique completion. In this paper we demonstrate how critical sets can be used in the design of secret sharing schemes.

1. Introduction

In information based systems, the integrity of the information is commonly provided for by requiring that certain operation(s) can be carried
out only by one or more participants who have access rights. Access is
gained through a key, password or token, and governed by a secure key
management scheme. If the key or password is shared between several participants in such a way that it can be reconstructed only by a sufficiently
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large and responsible group acting in agreement, then a high degree of security is attained. Shared security systems, of this sort, are also used in
financial institutions, in communication networks, in computing systems
serving educational institutions and distribution environments. However
the best known examples of applications of shared security systems are in
the military: For instance, in activating a nuclear weapon, several senior
officers must concur before the necessary password can be reconstructed.
Shared secret schemes were first introduced by Blakley [2], Shamir [14], and
Chaum [4], in 1979, and subsequently have been studied by numerous other
authors. For a general discussion of shared secret schemes see Simmons [16].
A number of mathematical structures have been used to model shared secret
schemes. Some of these are polynomials, geometric configurations, block
designs, Reed-Solomon codes, vector spaces, matroids, near-right fields,
complete multipartite graphs and orthogonal arrays.
In most real-world applications there is also a need for a hierarchy to
be built into the shared security system. That is, the key and password
is shared between s individuals of rank 1, ... , r so that if a person of rank
i is incapacitated, then a person of rank j ~ i, or a set of individuals of
rank l < i, may replace the lost data. Brickell [3]' Simmons [15] and [16],
and Beutelspacher [1], have adapted the basic schemes and constructed
multilevel systems. In this paper, we will show how general shared secret
schemes can be modeled on latin squares and demonstrate how these can
be adapted to realize multilevel schemes.
A secret sharing scheme is a method whereby n pieces of information
called shares or shadows are assigned to a secret key K. The shares have the
property that certain authorized groups of shares can be used to reconstruct
the secret key. The secret cannot be reconstructed from an unauthorized
group of shares. The recipients of the shares are called the participants in
the scheme. The set of participants is denoted by P. We let l den~e the
number of participants in the scheme; that is, IPI = l. The access structure
or concurrence scheme, r, of a secret sharing scheme is a subset of the power
set of P. The elements of the access structure are the authorized groupings
of participants whose shares can be used to reconstruct the secret. An
access structure is said to be monotone if for any subsets Band C of P,
where B ~ C and B E r, then C E r. If, in a secret sharing scheme, the
access structure is the set r = {A ~ Pit ~ IAI}, then the secret sharing
scheme is said to be a t-out-of-l secret sharing scheme. A t-out-of-l secret
sharing scheme is a method where by l pieces of information called shares
or shadows in a secret key K are distributed in such a way that
• the secret can be reconstructed from knowledge of any t or more
shares, and
• it cannot be reconstructed from knowledge of fewer than t shares.
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Such secret sharing schemes are said to be simple and referred to as tout-oJ-I threshold schemes (or (t, l)-threshold schemes) with threshold t. A
secret sharing scheme is said to be perfect if a participant, or an unauthorized group of participants, has no advantage in guessing the secret over an
outsider. Therefore a t-out-of-l secret sharing scheme is perJect if
• knowledge of fewer than t shares provides no information about K.
There is a definite need, particularly in the commercial arena, to develop
multilevel schemes in which the participants have differing capabilities when
reconstructing the secret. In an intrinsic scheme the capabilities of the participants when reconstructing the secret are a function of the information
content of the shares. In such schemes, two or more shares may be assigned
to one participant. However, this increases the complexity of the shares and
so decreases the ability of a participant to handle the shares securely. In an
extrinsic scheme the participants' differing capabilities when reconstructing the secret are a function of the relationship between the shares and
not a function of the information content of the shares. We deal only with
extrinsic schemes and give the following formal definition of a multilevel
scheme. In a multilevel or hierarchical scheme the participants are ranked
and placed in levels rl, ... ,rw . We assume that there are li participants in
level ri, for i = 1, ... ,w. So Li li = l. A secret key K is chosen and l pieces
of related information distributed, one piece to each participant. This is
done in such a way that the secret can be recovered from the shares of ti
participants of rank rio However, an incapacitated participant of rank ri
can be replaced by a participant of rank rj 2 ri, or at least two participants
of rank less than rio

2. Latin squares
Our model for a secret sharing scheme is based on the following combinatorial structure.
A latin square L, of order n, is an n x n array with entries chosen from
a set, N, of size n such that each entry occurs precisely once in each row
and column. For convenience, we sometimes talk of the latin square L as a
set of ordered triples (i,j; k) and take this to mean that element k occurs
in position (i, j) of the latin square L. If we index the rows and columns of
an array by the set N = {O, 1, ... , n - I}, with n > 1, then the array with
integer i + j(mod n) in position (i,j) is said to be a back circulant latin
square. Table 1 shows a back circulant latin square of order 6.
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Table 1.
A partial latin square, of order n, is an n x n array with entries chosen from
a set of size n in such a way that each entry occurs at most once in each
row and at most once in each column. The partial latin square may contain
a number of empty cells. We are interested in partial latin squares which
satisfy the following properties. A critical set in a latin square L, of order
n, is a set A = {(i,j;k) I i,j,k E {I, ... ,n}} such that

1. L is the only latin square, of order n, which has element k in position
(i,j) for each (i,j; k) E A, and
2. no proper subset of A satisfies 1.
A minimal critical set in a latin square L is a critical set of minimum
cardinality. For example, the latin square representing the abelian 2group, of order 22 , is given in Table 2, on the left. A minimal critical
set {(I, 1; 1), (1,2; 2), (2,4; 3), (3, 2; 4), (4, 3; 2)} for this latin square is given
on the right.
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Table 2.
We also require the definition of an isotopic latin square and the corresponding definitions for critical sets. Two latin squares Land M are said
to be isotopic or equivalent if there exists an ordered triple (a, (3, ,), of
permutations, such that a, (3, , map the rows, columns, and elements,
respectively, of L onto those of M. That is, two latin squares are isotopic,
if one can be transformed onto the other by rearranging rows, rearranging
columns or renaming elements. (For more details see [9]' pages 23 and 124.)
Two critical sets A and B are said to be isotopic if there exists an ordered
triple of permutations (a, (3, ,) which maps the entries of A onto B such
that, for all (x, y; z) E A, (xa, y(3; z,) E B.

36

There is not a lot known about critical sets for latin squares in general.
Results on critical sets for latin squares have appeared in papers by Cooper,
Donovan and Seberry [5], Donovan, Cooper, Nott and Seberry [6], NeIder
[11] and [12], Colbourn, Colbourn and Stinson [7], Curran and van Rees
[8], Smetaniuk [171, Stinson and van Rees [18] and Street [20]. However,
a class of critical sets is known for back circulant latin squares. For back
circulant latin squares of even order Curran and van Rees [8] showed that
the following set is a minimal critical set .
• Let n = 2m, for some positive integer m, and

C

=

{(i,j;i+j)

I

{(i,j;i+j)

I

i=0, ... ,n/2-1
and j = 0, ... , n/2 - 1 - i}
i=n/2+1, ... ,n-1
and j = n/2 - i, ... , n -I},

U

where addition of the last component is taken modulo n. Then C is
a minimal critical set in a back circulant latin square of order n. The
cardinality of this set is n 2 / 4.
They also obtained the following result for back circulant latin squares of
odd order .
• A back circulant latin square, of odd order n = 2m + 1, is the only
latin square which contains the set

C

{(i,j;i+j)

I

i=0, ... ,(n-3)/2
andj=0, ... ,(n-3)/2-i}

{(i,j;i+j)

I

U

i=(n+1)/2+1, ... ,n-1
and j = (n - 1)/2 - i, ... ,n -I}.

The cardinality of this set is (n 2

-

1)/4.

Cooper, Donovan and Seberry [5] subsequently showed that this set is a
critical set. Donovan, Cooper, Nott and Seberry [6] have also shown that
given a latin square L and a critical set A in L, then a class of critical sets
in L may be obtained by taking certain isotopic images of A. Similarly a
class of critical sets in L may be obtained by taking certain conjugates of

A.
3. Proposed scheme

A secret sharing scheme can be constructed in which the secret key is a latin
square L, of order n. This scheme exhibits the following characteristics.
The latin square is taken to be the secret key and therefore kept private.

37

However, the order of the latin square is made public knowledge. The
shares in the secret are based on a partial latin square S = {UAi I Ai
is a critical set in L}. The union can be taken over all possible critical
sets in L or over some subset of critical sets. The number of critical sets
used will be dependent on the size of the latin square and the number of
participants in the secret sharing scheme. The access structure will be the
set r = {B I B ~ Sand B :2 A where A is some critical set in L}. One can
easily see that r is monotone. The protocol for a secret sharing scheme,
involving 1 participants and based on a latin square is as follows.
Protocol:
• A latin square L of order n is chosen. The number n is made public,
but the latin square L is kept secret and taken to be the key.
• A set S which is the union of a number of critical sets in L is defined.
• For each (i,j; k) E S, the share (i,j; k) is distributed privately to a
participant.
• When a group of participants whose shares constitute a critical set
come together, they can reconstruct the latin square L and hence the
secret key.
We will demonstrate how the scheme works on a few small examples and
then give a more general construction.
Take the latin square of order 3 given in Table 3.
1 2 3
2 3 1
312
Table 3.

Let S= {(2, 1; 2), (3,2; 1), (1,3; 3)}. We can construct a 2-out-of-3 secret
sharing scheme on this set. The secret is taken to be the latin square given
above. When any two participants come together they combine their shares
and reconstruct the unique latin square containing their shares.
For a slightly larger example, take the latin square given in Table 2.
Let S be the partial latin square {(I, 1; 1), (1,2; 2), (2,4; 3), (3,2; 4), (4,3; 2),
(1,3; 3), (1, 4; 4), (2,2; 1), (3,4; 2), (4, 1; 4)}. All parties are told that the order of the latin square is 4. Each participant is given a share (i,j;k), for
one such element of S. In order to recover the secret an authorized group
of participant must place their shares in a partial latin square. They then
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reconstruct the unique latin square containing these elements. These authorized groups are based on the critical sets contained in S. Some of the
critical sets contained in S are
Al = {(I, 1; 1), (1, 2; 2), (2,4; 3), (3,2; 4), (4,3; 2)},
A2 = {(I, 1; 1), (1, 3; 3), (2,4; 3), (3,2; 4), (4,3; 2)},

A3 =
A4 =
A5 =
A6 =
A7 =
As =

{(I, 1; 1), (1,4; 4), (2,4; 3), (3, 2; 4), (4,3; 2)},
{(I, 1; 1), (2, 2; 1), (2,4; 3), (3, 2; 4), (4,3; 2)},
{(I, 1; 1), (3,4; 2), (2,4; 3), (3,2; 4), (4,3; 2)},
{(I, 1; 1), (4, 1; 4), (2,4; 3), (3,2; 4), (4,3; 2)},
{(I, 3; 3), (1,4; 4), (2,2; 1), (3,4; 2), (4, 1; 4)},
{(I, 3; 3), (1,1; 1), (2,2; 1), (3,4; 2), (4, 1; 4)}.

Now for a more general example. Let L be a latin square isotopic to"
a back circulant latin square of order nand C an appropriate critical set
isotopic to the set given by Curran and van Rees. Define C = {CJ I C J is
the conjugate or isotopic image of C}. Let SJ = {CJ I C J E C and C J is a
critical set in L}. We may now use the protocol given above to construct a
secret sharing scheme where the shares are drawn from the set SJ.
The following points should be made about the secret sharing scheme.
• Since the authorized groups are based on critical sets in latin squares,
the absence of one share implies that the secret cannot be recovered
uniquely.
• The scheme is obviously not perfect as an outsider must guess from the
set of all possible latin squares of order n, whereas an unauthorized
group of participants knows that the latin square must contain the
partial latin square defined by their shares.
• The security of the scheme is based on the number of possible latin
squares containing the partial latin square defined by an unauthorized
group of participants. Rezny [13] has estimated this for a number of
back circulant latin squares of small order. He took the critical set
C

=

{(i,j;i+j)

I

{(i,j;i+j)

I

i=O, ... ,(n-3)/2
andj=O, ... ,(n-3)/2-i} U
i=(n+l)/2+1, ... ,n-l
and j = (n -1)/2 - i, ... ,n -I}.

and for n = 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 he systematcially removed an element
from C and used a computer to obtain the number of latin squares
which contain C \ {(i,j; k)}, for some element (i,j; k) of C. Rezny's
results are summarized in Table 4.
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n
3

Number oflatin squares containing the set C \ {(i, j; k)}

5
7
9
11

32
~
880
> 75232
~
19000000

4

Table 4.
4. Multilevel scheme
In many situations we require a secret sharing scheme in which some shares
are more equal than others. That is, we require a multilevel scheme. As
stated earlier, these schemes incorporate levels each of which has a nurilber
of authorized groups who can reconstruct the secret. However, for the system to be truly functional we also require that the share of a participant at
level i can be replaced by two or more participants at a lower level. Consider
the case of an electronic transfer of funds between financial institutions.
This transfer can only be initiated when a electronic signature is received.
The signature will be reconstructed when the shares of two senior tellers
and one vice president, or two vice presidents, are entered. We can use the
latin square given in Table 3 to construct a secret sharing scheme which
satisfies these requirements. Let S= {(2, 1; 2), (3,2; 1), (1, 1; 1), (1,2; 2)}.
The access structure for this scheme will be based on the critical sets

Al = {(I, 1; 1), (1, 2; 2), (2,1; 2)}

A2 = {(l, 1; 1), (1, 2; 2), (3, 2; I)}
A3 = {(3, 2; 1), (2, 1; 2)}.

The latin square can be reconstructed from the shares (2,1; 2) and (3,2; 1).
However either of these two shares can be replaced by the two shares (1, 1; 1)
and (1,2; 2). To satisfy the requirements of the model we could distribute
the shares as follows:
1. The senior tellers each receive a share corresponding to one of the
triples (1,1; 1) and (1,2; 2), respectively, and

2. the vice presidents each receive a share corresponding to one of the
triples (2,1; 2) and (3,2; 1), respectively,
thus satisfying the requirement.

5. A further application
Consider the situation where there are a number of secret sharing schemes
all of which contain a common participant. This participant may be re-
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quired to remember a number of shares. For example, a medical administrator may require access to several restricted files. These files may contain, say, patient data, hospital resources and organ bank data. Access
to these files may be via a secret sharing scheme in which the registrar of
the hospital always has a critical share. The registrar may be required to
remember several different shares. This obviously increases the complexity
of the registrar's role and consequently reduces the security of the schemes.
Therefore we wish to develop a key management scheme in which a secret
key is common to a number of secret sharing schemes. The shares related,
to this key are such that a primary share is held by one participant and
this share is a necessary part of the reconstruction process in each scheme.
Each scheme will involve a number of minor shares which when combined
with the primary share can be used to reconstruct the secret. In addition it
is required that the secret cannot be recovered uniquely from the combined
information held by the minor shares.
Inequivalent critical sets in a latin square can be used to model a key
management scheme of this nature. We illustrate this with an example.
Take the latin square of order 5 given in Table 5.
1
2
3
4
5

2
1
5
3
4

3
4
1
5
2

4
5
2
1
3

5
3
4
2
1

Table 5.
Using results obtained by Cooper, Donovan and Seberry in [5] and the
computer program nauty [10] it can be shown that there are 41 distinct
minimal critical sets of order 7, three of these are listed below.
Al

=

({I, 1; 1), (2, 5; 3), (3, 5; 4), (4, 2; 3), (4, 3; 5), (5, 1; 5), (5,3; 2)}

A2 = ({I, 1; 1), (1,5; 5), (3, 2; 5), (3, 5; 4), (4, 2; 3), (5,3; 2), (5,4; 3)}
A3 = ({I, 1; 1), (1, 5; 5), (3,4; 2), (4, 2; 3), (4, 5; 2), (5,2; 4), (5,4; 3)}
Each department is assigned a different critical set Ai with the common
participant receiving a share common to each Ai. In this case the registrar
will be given the share (1,1; 1). All departments will reconstruct the same
secret, but each has a different sets of keys to this secret. However if all
participants in the minor levels pool their information the secret cannot
be reconstructed uniquely. To see this consider the partial latin square
containing all the minor shares.
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* * * *

* * * *
* 5 * 2
* 3 5 *

5

4

2

3

5

3
4
2

*

It is not a critical set as it has four completions.
This key management system can be adapted to allow each department
a different secret, but still have a common primary share. This idea can be
extended further to each department's having a latin square of a different
order.
6. Concluding comments
In this paper we have proposed a viable secret sharing scheme based on
latin squares. Unfortunately, not a great deal is known about critical sets
for latin squares and so the implementation of this scheme is limited at the
present time. One obvious direction for future research is the construction
of general families of critical sets for latin squares. Another is to investigate
the structure of these critical sets to see if it is possible to construct general
t-out-of-l perfect threshold schemes from latin squares. Stinson [19]' and
others have been studying the information rates of secret sharing schemes.
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